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Abstract
The review concerns the position of the identification as ‘mother’ or ‘father’ of trans
persons who give birth. This matter has occupied courts in the United Kingdom, Ger-
many, Brazil and Sweden recently, and could well arise in South Africa, our country of
origin. The first part of the discussion relates to a claim of a trans man who gave birth to
be registered as the father of the child. The legal situation in South Africa and the United
Kingdom is compared, and particular focus is placed on the meaning of ‘mother’.
A second issue for discussion relates to the right of the child born to a trans person to
birth registration, notably, what the child’s interests are in relation to his or her parent’s
identification details on his or her birth certificate. We conclude that the gender identity
of the trans parent must be the primary factor determining his or her registration as a
parent on the birth certificate, and that this solution also better serves the child’s best
interests.
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On 21 April 2017, a child known only as YY was conceived by means of intra-uterine
insemination fertility treatment in the United Kingdom. This is not novel or particularly
ground-breaking- children are conceived by means of fertility treatment increasingly
often. However, in this case, just 10 days earlier, on 11 April 2017, a Gender Recognition
Certificate had been issued to the person to whom YY would be born confirming that he
was male.
Freddy McConnell (referred to throughout the judement as TT by reason of an
anonymity order),1 a man in law for all intents and purposes, got pregnant, carried the
pregnancy to full term; in January 2018 he gave birth to his son YY. However, upon
registration of the birth, McConnell (or TT), who was not married nor in a relationship at
the time of YY’s birth, was informed that he had to be registered as the ‘mother’ on YY’s
birth certificate. This led to him bringing a claim for judicial review of the Registrar
General’s decision to register him as the ‘mother’ and not father, or alternatively to
register him as the ‘parent’, of the child he had given birth to.
The question put to the High Court (Family Division) for determination was thus, as
The Right Honourable Sir Andrew McFarlane so clearly put it: ‘Is that man the “mother”
or the “father” of his child?’2
Counsel for TT essentially argued his case based on the assumption that the terms
‘mother’ and ‘father’ are inherently gendered terms; or put in overly simple terms:
mother ¼ female and father ¼ male. Thus, as TT was legally male at the time YY was
born, he averred that he must be registered as YY’s father. In contrast, counsel for the
government asserted that ‘mother’ did not necessarily refer solely to the female gender
(or father to the male gender) but rather, as a matter of UK domestic law, the term
‘mother’ means the person who gave birth to the child.3 ‘On the government’s case, the
attribution of status is of mother determined by the person’s biological role in the process
of conception, pregnancy and birth; on TT and YY’s case, the attribution of status is
determined by reference to a person’s gender at the time of the child’s birth’.4
In order to properly understand the nuances of these two arguments, it is necessary to
briefly explain the difference between sex and gender, bearing in mind that the definition
of these terms is constantly evolving, and that there are differences of opinion among
various groups of persons.5
In the last 45 years, ‘gender’ has been understood as different to ‘sex’ by reference to a
difference between the body, biology and being male or female (‘sex’) and social and
cultural roles inscribed on bodies; masculinity and femininity (‘gender’).6
Sex has been traditionally understood as the biological distinction between men and
women.7 This biological distinction is made up of the presence or absence of certain
organs, sex characteristics and hormones. Thus, which internal and external organs are
present in a person, as well as certain hormonal factors, will determine whether one is
classified as male or female.
On the other hand, gender is commonly regarded as referring to how society thinks
men and women should act (as defined by their real or perceived biological differences)
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or how they ought to behave so that their behaviour accords with their sex. According to
the World Health Organization it is the ‘socially constructed characteristics of men and
women – such a norms, roles, and relationships of and between men and women’.8 It is
the ‘manner in which culture defines and constrains the differences between men and
women’.9 In other words, ‘gender typically refers only to the behavioural, social and
psychological characteristics of men and women’.10
To bring this back to TT’s case, it can be seen that his counsel argued that ‘mother’ is
a gendered term, while counsel for the State submitted that ‘mother’ is linked to the
definition of sex i.e. it is solely informed by the biological processes of carrying and
subsequently giving birth to a child. What role the parent will play thereafter is irrele-
vant, in this line of thought.
For the sake of completing an explanation of terminology, it is prudent to grapple with
the term ‘gender identity’. While ‘gender’ refers to socially constructed ideas about how
men and women should behave, the activities they should perform, what they should like
(e.g. the colour pink vs the colour blue) and their general disposition, gender identity is
not per se a social construct, but rather how an individual perceives their own gender (as
opposed to how society thinks they should act). It is commonly understood as the ‘sense
of knowing to which sex one belongs, that is, the awareness that “I am a male” or “I am a
female”’.11 It is the ‘core sense of the self as male, female or somewhere on the spectrum
outside the binary’.12 Professor Stephen Whittle summarises the interaction between
gender identity and gender as follows:
Gender identity is the total perception of an individual about his or her own gender. It
includes a basic personal identity as a boy or girl, man or woman, as well as personal
judgments about the individual’s level of conformity to the societal norms of masculinity
and femininity. Gender as others perceive it is called gender role. The two concepts are tied
together, since most people show their perceptions of themselves in their dress, manners and
activities. Clothing is the major public signifier of gender that allows other people to
immediately identify an individual’s gender role, but there are other signifiers as well, such
as mannerisms or occupational choice. For most people, their gender identity, gender role
and all the symbolic manifestations of gender will be congruent. But trans people do not
necessarily feel that they fit neatly into either the male or female role as designated at birth
or that their behaviour is not totally congruent with the rules and expectations of the society
they live in for any of the two gender disembodied law: trans people’s legal (outer)space
roles offered.13
In law, gender and sex feature extensively in international treaties and in domestic law
globally as prohibited grounds for discrimination, violence and persecution (generally by
means of equality laws seeking to ensure that inequality between males and females is
eradicated). However, gender identity is somewhat new in the legal terrain. It is often
grouped with gender or sex in order to bring it into the realm of the law, thus making it
capable of protection. Often gender identity is found in international resolutions and
commitments that are not binding, for instance in the Yogyakarta Principles and the
YPþ10.14 Thus while TT and his counsel couch their argument in terms of ‘gender’, it
could be argued that Freddy is actually fighting for recognition of his male ‘gender
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identity’; fighting to be recognised as YY’s father – the role he identifies with and wants
the world at large to acknowledge him as.
Legislation relating to gender transition in the United Kingdom
and South Africa
Both the United Kingdom (‘UK’) and South Africa (‘SA’) have enacted legislation
allowing trans persons to change their legal gender from that which they were assigned
at birth to the gender which they identify with. In the UK, this legislation is the Gender
Recognition Act of 2004 (‘GRA’) and its South African counterpart is the Alteration of
Sex Description and Sex Status Act of 2003 (‘Alteration Act’). In terms of both the GRA
and the Alteration Act, the change of a person’s legal gender (UK) or sex (SA) has no
retrospective effect. That is, a person is for all intents and purposes their acquired gender
from the date on which their gender certificate is issued (UK) or date upon which altered
sex is recorded (SA) (bar certain exceptions in terms of the GRA).15 However, the
change of gender/ alteration of sex description ‘does not affect things done, or events
occurring, before the certificate is issued’16 (or as South African legislation puts it:
‘Rights and obligations that have been acquired by or accrued to such a person before
the alteration of his or her sex description are not adversely affected by the alteration’17)
In South Africa, the consequences of altering one’s sex are not qualified in any way.
There are no exceptions; a person whose sex has been altered in terms of the Alteration
Act ‘is deemed for all purposes to be a person of the sex description so altered as from the
date of the recording of such alteration’.18 In the UK, while s9 of the GRA states that the
general consequences are that ‘[w]here a full gender recognition certificate is issued to a
person, the person’s gender becomes for all purposes the acquired gender’, this general
provision is followed by a number of circumstances (exceptions) where the ‘general’
consequence, namely legal recognition of a person’s true gender identity, may not apply.
The initial Court in TT found that it was possible that one of these circumstances was
parenthood. Parenthood is found in s12 of the GRA which states ‘the fact that a person’s
gender has become the acquired gender under this Act does not affect the status of the
person as the father or mother of a child’. The Right Honourable Sir Andrew McFarlane
concluded that
GRA 2004, s 12 may be both retrospective and prospective. If that is so then the status of a
person as the father or mother of a child is not affected by the acquisition of gender under
the Act, even where the relevant birth has taken place after the issue of a GR certificate.19
This interpretation of s12 of the GRA was confirmed in April 2020 by the Court of
Appeal.20 The Appeal Court dismissed the appeal brought by TT, finding that an inter-
pretation of s12 that is both retrospective and prospective was ‘clearly correct’.21
The Alteration Act contains no specific ‘exceptions’ to the rule that once an appli-
cation for alteration of sex has been granted, ‘a person whose sex description has been
altered, is deemed for all purposes to be a person of the sex description so altered as from
the date of the recording of such alteration’.22 The only proviso is that ‘rights and
obligations that have been acquired by or accrued to such a person before the alteration
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of his or her sex description are not adversely affected by the alteration’.23 It is thus not
necessary to embark on interpretation of the statute or an enquiry into prospectivity or
retrospectivity of a provision contained therein. For all things before the date of altera-
tion, a person will remain their birth-assigned gender in the eyes of the law, but only if
rights and obligations would be negatively affected. For all things which occur after the
date of alteration, a person is in the eyes of the law their acquired gender. Therefore, a
trans man who gives birth to a child post alteration, as occurred with TT, would have to
be registered as the child’s father in South Africa.
McConnell is not the first trans man to conceive, carry and give birth to his own
child,24 nor is he the first to want to be registered as that child’s father. In 2017, a case
with near similar facts was brought (on appeal) before the Federal Court of Justice (Der
Bundesgerichtshof),25 Germany’s highest court in the system of ordinary justice. In this
case (‘the German case’), the court found that the applicant must be registered on his
child’s birth certificate as the mother and moreover, must be registered according to his
birth name (read: his ‘dead’ name). Just as the GRA contains exceptions to the general
consequences of gender recognition, so does it’s German counterpart – the Gesetz über
die Änderung der Vornamen und die Feststellung der Geschlechtszugehörigkeit in
besonderen Fällen (‘TSG’), more commonly known as the Transsexuals Act. § 10 TSG
states that ‘Once the decision that the applicant is to be considered to belong to the
opposite gender has become final, his or her gender related rights and duties shall be
governed by the new gender unless otherwise stated by law’. This general consequence is
followed by § 11 (titled Parent-to-child relationship) which states that ‘The decision that
the applicant shall be considered to belong to the other sex shall be without prejudice
to the legal nature of the relations of the applicant and his or her parents as well as
between the applicant and his or her children, in case of adopted children only if they
were adopted before the decision became final. The same applies to the descendants of
these children’. The court noted that the legislature intended that this would apply to both
children born before and after a person has legally changed their gender. This can be
deduced, inter alia, by the fact that ‘[t]he principle that the change of sex of the parent
does not affect the legal relationship with his or her children is expressly limited in time
with regard to the time of their adoption only in the case of adopted children. The
obvious reverse conclusion, that there is no comparable time limit for natural children
with regard to the time of their birth is expressly supported by the genesis of the law,
which can be found in the legislative materials’.26 In 2018, the same court, and on the
basis of their previous ruling, held that a trans woman whose sperm had been used in the
conception of a child born to her female partner had to be registered as the father of
the child.27 The Federal Court of Justice ruled that a trans woman ‘can be seen in terms of
parental rights only as father and not as mother’.
A detailed discussion of the German position on the definition of the word ‘mother’ is
not necessary for comparative purposes. Nevertheless, there is a definition of the word
‘mother’ in German Law. § 1591 of the Civil Code states that ‘the mother of a child is the
woman who gave birth to it’. In the German case, it was argued that as the applicant was
legally a male when he gave birth to his child, he did not fall within the above definition
of a mother. The Court was not persuaded by this argument.
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In contrast to the decisions of the German and UK courts, Sweden does allow for trans
persons who have had children after legally changing their gender to be registered on the
child’s official birth registration documents according to their acquired gender. This
occurred as a direct result of two cases brought by trans men. The first claimant, who
appeared before the Göteborg Administrative Court, gave birth before legally changing
his gender marker to male, Case no. 6186-14, 5 October 2015; and the second claimant,
before the Stockholm Administrative Court, gave birth after changing his gender marker
to male.28 Both claimants were successful. It is unclear what the specific reasons utilised
in the judgments were as the judgments are not available to the public (for privacy
reasons, it seems), however it appears that reliance was placed on Art 8 (right to respect
for private and family life) of the European Convention.29 It should be noted that as of 1
January 2019, Sweden amended its Children and Parents Code to provide that only
where the child is born after the parent has changed their gender marker, will the new
gender marker be used when registering the child.30 This means that there is now
alignment between legal gender and parenthood in Sweden.
In Brazil, a court recently recognised a trans woman, who also happened to be the
genetic parent to the child (having provided the sperm), as the mother of the child for the
purposes of birth registration. She had previously been recorded as the ‘socio affective’
(ie adoptive mother) (for the purposes of health insurance for the infant). The gestational
and biological mother was also recorded as ‘mother’. The court ruling confirmed the
trans woman’s status as biological mother, notwithstanding that her contribution was that
of male gametes.31
Common law definition of Mother
Under the UK Children Act 1989, an unmarried father can acquire parental responsi-
bilities in three ways. First, when he becomes registered as the child’s parent under the
Births and Deaths Registration Act, 1953; second, upon entering into a parental respon-
sibility agreement with the mother of the child; and third, upon application to court for
the award of parental responsibility. The Act does not provide a definition of ‘mother’ or
‘father’. Therefore, reliance had to be placed on the common law meaning of ‘mother’.
The initial TT judgment concludes that at UK common law, the person who ‘carries a
pregnancy and gives birth to a child is that child’s “mother”’.32 ‘The attribution of
motherhood is a consequence of the individual’s unique role in the biological process
of pregnancy and birth’.33 The reasoning of the honourable Justice McFarlane in coming
to this conclusion seems to ring true:
It is necessary to be crystal clear that in stating what the position at common law must be,
I am, at this stage, doing no more than looking back to earlier times, prior to the mid-20th
century, when conception and pregnancy other than through sexual intercourse was
unknown and where gender was primarily determined by genital examination at birth and
then maintained for life. In that context, the lack of copious authority on the question does
not, given the nature of the issue, indicate that there is any doubt as to the answer. In those
times, at common law a person who became pregnant, through the insemination of an egg in
their womb, and who subsequently gave birth to a child must have been that child’s mother.
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In this the law was doing no more than reflecting common sense, common experience and
the basic facts of life; motherhood was established by the act of giving birth, or ‘parturition’
to use Lord Simon’s phrase, and a person who became pregnant and gave birth was a
‘mother’.34
If this was also the position at common law in South Africa, it is submitted that the
legal position has been developed, while in the UK it has not. A case in point is
surrogacy. In the UK, while surrogacy is legal, a surrogacy agreement cannot be
enforced by law. The surrogate mother will be the child’s legal parent at birth, with full
parental rights and responsibilities. The commissioning parent(s) can only obtain par-
ental rights and responsibilities after the child has been born through adoption or by
obtaining a parental order.35 The common law position that she who births the child is
the mother thus remains. In South Africa, surrogacy is fully regulated by the Children’s
Act 38 of 2005. The surrogate motherhood agreement must be confirmed by a High
Court prior to the surrogate mother being artificially inseminated, it is legally enforce-
able, and ‘the effect of a valid surrogate motherhood agreement is that any child born of a
surrogate mother in accordance with the agreement is for all purposes the child of the
commissioning parent or parents from the moment of the birth of the child concerned’.36
Further, while in TT it was concluded that every child must have a mother, as a result
of South Africa’s progressive Constitution and case law surrounding gay rights, it is
common cause that a child can instead have 2 fathers and no mother (same-sex com-
missioning parents) or even just 1 father (single male commissioning parent).37 South
Africa is of course not the only jurisdiction in which the commissioning parents are
legally the surrogate born child’s parents as from birth, such as in Greece, Georgia and
Ukraine.38
In light of the above, we see no impediment in theory to a trans man who gets
pregnant and gives birth to a child being registered as his child’s father in South Africa.
That said, he would likely still face many procedural and administrative obstacles in his
quest to be registered as the child’s father. This is also because the registering authority,
the Department of Home Affairs, is notoriously recalcitrant both in providing essential
services to trans people in general,39 as well as in relation to birth registration by fathers
in the absence of birth mothers, as recent constitutional litigation discussed below tends
to illustrate.40
Firstly, if it is assumed that the child will be conceived by means of artificial repro-
duction, as YY was, the provisions of the Regulations relating to the Artificial Fertilisa-
tion of Persons, 2016 will need to be complied with. While these Regulations are
surprisingly gender neutral, it will be difficult to comply with s16 (‘Reporting the Birth’)
if it is the father who births the child. Section 16(1)(b) of the regulations state that ‘the
mother who gives birth must ensure that the competent person who effected the artificial
fertilisation of or embryo transfer is informed of such birth and recording of the infor-
mation referred to in sub -regulation (2), within 30 days of such birth’. If it is the father
who gave birth, could this peremptory provision still be complied with?
Secondly, in terms of the Children’s Act 28 of 2005, full parental rights and respon-
sibilities of a child is automatically afforded to the child’s biological mother (bar certain
circumstances, such as where the mother is a minor herself or in surrogacy
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arrangements).41 The biological father only acquires full rights and responsibilities if he
is married to the child’s mother (at conception, at birth, or anytime in between).42 The
issue here is that a trans man who gives birth and wants to be registered as the father of
his child is not the mother, nor is he married to her. The trans man would therefore have
to ‘acquire’ parental rights and responsibilities, but this is also not so simple. In terms of
the Children’s Act
The biological father of a child who does not have parental responsibilities and rights in
respect of the child in terms of section 20, acquires full parental responsibilities and rights in
respect of the child-
(a) if at the time of the child’s birth he is living with the mother in a permanent life-
partnership; or
(b) if he, regardless of whether he has lived or is living with the mother-
(i) consents to be identified or successfully applies in terms of section 26 to be identified as
the child’s father or pays damages in terms of customary law;
(ii) contributes or has attempted in good faith to contribute to the child’s upbringing for a
reasonable period;
(iii) contributes or has attempted in good faith to contribute towards expenses in connection
with the maintenance of the child for a reasonable period.43
The problem is he does not meet these requirements either. In terms of sub-section (a),
he does not live with the mother. Regarding subsection (b), the conditions for application
to court in terms of s2644 are not met. In terms of s26, where a person is claiming
paternity, they may apply for an amendment to the child’s birth certificate with the
mother of the child’s consent. Alternatively, they can apply to court for an order con-
firming paternity where the mother refuses to consent, cannot consent due to mental
illness, the mother cannot be located, or she is deceased. As none of these conditions can
be met, is therefore unclear on what basis an application to court can be made.
Thirdly, one would need to find a way to bypass the requirements for birth registration
as contained in the Regulations on the Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 2014. The
most problematic regulation is Regulation 12, which deals with the registration of the
birth a child born out of wedlock. Sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 12 states that
‘a notice of birth of a child born out of wedlock shall be made by the mother of the
child on Form DHA-24 illustrated in Annexure 1A of Form DHA- 24/LRB illustrated in
annexure 1A, whichever applicable’. The question which must then be posed is whether
it is possible for the child to be registered at all, as the child has no mother to register him
or her, only a father. This issue as to whether a father can register a child’s birth is not
unique to trans men, and in 2018, the Grahamstown High Court declared Regulation
12(1) unconstitutional and invalid because it ‘inhibits access to the rights in sections
28(1)(a) and (2) of the Constitution’.45 Subsequently, Centre for Child Law v. Director
General: Department of Home Affairs and Others) was decided on the 19th of May 2020.
The matter appealed was the prior ruling of the same court relating to section 10 of the
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Births and Deaths Registration Act, which (while holding Regulation 12 unconstitu-
tional) dismissed the leg of the application that section of the Births and Deaths Regis-
tration Act was also unconstitutional. The declaration of unconstitutionality of section 10
and of Regulation 12 remain to be confirmed by the Constitutional Court, which may
come to the assistance of unmarried fathers generally, including trans fathers.
It is further submitted, however, that registering a trans man as the mother of the child
could be in breach of his Constitutional rights to dignity46 and equality.47 In South
Africa, the equality clause in the Constitution contains a list of grounds upon which
discrimination is prohibited. Discrimination on the basis of transgender status is not a
listed ground of discrimination in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.
However, the Constitution does not only prohibit discrimination on the grounds listed
therein, but also prohibits unfair discrimination on any other ground. Whescrimination is
on an unlisted ground, such as transgender status, the discrimination will amount to
unfair discrimination and thus will be prohibited where it ‘impairs the fundamental
dignity of the person’ or ‘affects them in a comparably serious manner’. In September
v. Subramoney NO,48 the Equality Court found that gender identity (and trans gender
identity) is included in the right to dignity in South Africa. Thus, although not expressly
stated, discrimination on the basis of status of a person as trans is prohibited. Therefore,
should the state department in charge of recording births find that a trans man who gives
birth must be registered as the mother of the child, a Constitutional challenge could be
mounted in terms of the right to equality and dignity.
Birth registration and the right to identity as a child’s
human right
Turning to the second issue we aim to address, that concerns the position of YY. His
rights to birth registration,49 to identity50 and knowledge of origins, non-discrimina-
tion,51 best interests52 and dignity53 are all at stake. Much of the academic debate in
recent times has turned on the child’s right to know his or her biological origins, in the
context of surrogacy and of artificial reproduction.54
It is arguably only quite recently that birth registration55 has been explicitly char-
acterised as a human right. This contention is made despite the fact that the right to birth
registration is recognised as early as 1966 in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.56 Almost nothing had been written on the scope and content of the right
to birth registration until the 1990s (in contrast to extensive writing on the right to
nationality). Birth registration was seen as an administrative function of the executive
arm of state.57 Even now, the function is described as ‘recognition by the legal system
concerned’.58 How that legal recognition should proceed is not really described in
international law, save that issues have arisen concerning the limitations the state can
impose on the parents’ choice of name for the child where this would be contrary to the
best interests of a child.59 Tobin notes that, at minimum, registration of birth must
include particulars of the child’s name; date and place of birth; the names and addresses
of the child’s parents; the parents’ nationality or nationalities and the sex of the child
(including the capacity to record an ambiguous or non-binary sexual identity).60 He is
also of the view that the definition of a child’s parents should not be limited to a
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traditional conception of parents ‘and must extend to registering the parents genetic,
biological and social parents’.61 He states, though, that the CRC Committee has yet to
indicate what information should be contained on identity documents.62 Details on a
child’s birth registration certificate are not cast in stone, but can be changed – e.g. when
an alternation of gender marker is sought.
While birth registration and certification has been regarded as being mostly con-
cerned with establishing a child’s legal personhood, and while it is now clearly recog-
nised in the literature as a right of the child, the scope and contours of this rights are still
largely couched as desirable civic and political bureaucratic goods, to be effected by one
or another governmental entity for civic coherence purposes.63 Birth registration is
required for a child to get a birth certificate – his or her first legal proof of identity.64
Less clear is whether the right to birth registration includes the right to a birth
certificate. Writing in 2011, Gerber et al argue that the right to a certificate is implicit
in the right to registration65; for a moment, assuming this is true, a second question that
may arise is whose birth certificate is it? The state’s, the parent’s or the child’s? If it is
considered primarily that of the child, this may be relevant to YY’s legal and rights-
based interests in what information is recorded on his birth certificate. This is accorded
some attention towards the end of this section of the article.
A second relevant CRC right is the child’s right to identity and to know one’s
biological origins.66 Tobin asserts that ‘from a human rights law perspective, identity
is critical because it transforms the biological entity into a legal being and confirms the
existence of a specific legal personality capable of bearing rights and duties’.67 The right
to identity has become extremely topical in the era of artificial reproduction, in cases of
surrogacy, anonymous sperm and egg donation and so forth. Anonymous birth (baby
baskets) has been extensively before the European Court on Human Rights, and has also
attracted comments on from the CRC Committee.68 The South African Law Commission
is busy with an investigation into this very topic, and an Issue Paper titled ‘The child’s
rights to know his or her biological origins’ was released in 2017.69 In the United
Kingdom, legislation was passed in 2008 removing donor anonymity.70 It is well estab-
lished that the right to know one’s biological origins is a right of the child.
The right to identity and the right to birth registration are linked, but not equivalent.
The right to identity builds on the right to birth registration. Usang Assim provides that
identity is a ‘distinctly autonomous right’ which support the proposition that there are
other elements of identity which expand upon the right to birth registration.71 ‘Identity is
a complex mix of factors that contributes to a person’s sense of self knowledge, self-
awareness, and self-esteem. Identity asserts a person’s existence and establishes his or
her individuality while distinguishing him or her from other members of society . . . The
concept of identity is basic to the claim, guarantee, and enjoyment of rights. Thus,
identity has been defined as a right that “protects an individual’s significant and know-
able personal attributes and social relationships”’.72 Irrespective of the consideration of
the balancing act or margin of appreciation73 accorded States as regards the weight to be
accorded the child’s rights to know his or her biological origins vis a vis other rights, the
initial court in TT correctly asks whether it is the child’s biological relationship that
should be reflected on the birth certificate (the government’s claim) or the familial and
social reality (TT’s and YY’s claim)?74 International law provides no clear answer to this
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as the definition and contours of identity are opaque and were controversial at the time of
the drafting of the CRC. It is clear that name, nationality and family relations are
elements, but that identity is not limited to these.75 Several components of identity are
not fixed or immutable but are shaped by parental and community influence over time,
and by the child’s own life experiences. Identity formation is a dynamic process, which is
never completed.76 Assim also links the right to identity to the right to dignity, which
arises for discussion later.
The best interests of the child and the right to dignity
The best interests of the child was raised in both the High Court and Appeal Court
judgments. The obligation to give effect to this principle is incurred under article 3(1)
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), according this primary consider-
ation.77 The CRC Committee’s General Comment No 14 (The best interests of the
child)78 is instructive. The Committee is clear that the best interest of the child are ‘a
fundamental, interpretative legal principle: If a legal provision is open to more than one
interpretation, the interpretation which most effectively serves the child’s best interests
should be chosen’.79 Moreover, the child’s best interests are supposed to be a primary
consideration80: and they apply to the child as an individual.81 It applies explicitly
against those public institutions concerned with giving effect to children’s civil rights
and freedoms, such as birth registration, which is mentioned eo nomine in the General
Comment.82
In TT, the child’s (YY’s) interests in this matter concerned how his parent was to be
recorded on the birth certificate.83 ‘The guardian ad litem for YY had claimed in the
initial hearing that it is important for YY’s identity and self-esteem that his birth certif-
icate reflect the reality of his life. The person who gave birth to him is and was male.
“Father” means male parent. That is exactly what TT is. Anything else gives the impres-
sion of something secretive or shameful. This could lead to YY feeling excluded from
society and that he is different or odd’.84 Noting that one parent would then be ‘missing’
from the birth certificate, counsel correctly pointed out that many children do not have a
parent listed on their birth certificate, albeit that this is inevitably a father (although
unusual, it is not impossible that the identity of the mother is unknown). At the core of
the argument of the guardian ad litem was that the contents of the birth certificate itself
are part and parcel of the child’s right to an identity.
A subsidiary argument was that listing TT as a mother would set his (TT’s) quest to
have his male identity recognised right back to square one, and this itself could have an
indirect adverse impact on YY. She (the guardian ad litem) concluded that it would be
overwhelmingly in YY’s best interests for TT to be registered as YY’s father. The best
interests argument put forward was underscored by the fact that it was inconceivable that
YY would not come to know the circumstances of his birth, and therefore, that the legal
position as recorded on his birth certificate should reflect the realities of his family life.85
Counsel for YY had asserted in the High Court that Parliament had failed to provide
for the circumstances of YYs conception within the legislative scheme of the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 2008 or elsewhere. Where that Act sets out specific
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means of artificial reproduction, they do not include insemination of TT, a male, by
donor sperm.86
Countering this, the Secretary of State argued that the registration of the person
carrying and giving birth to YY as a ‘mother’ was justified by the child’s right to
know – and have properly recognised – the identity of the birthing parent, calling
this an important and consistent principle that applies throughout birth registration
legislation, including in relation to adoption, surrogacy and children born by donor
conception.87 In essence, this approach seeks to limit the best interests of the child
principle by reference to the need for a ‘certain and coherent administrative scheme
for the registration of births’.88
The legal waters were muddied by the following two dilemmas: first, if the court were
to exercise a discretion89 to recognise TT as the legal father of YY, he would thereafter
have to apply for a parental responsibilities order by virtue of s4 of the Children’s Act of
1989. This is because he qualified as an unmarried father at the time of birth. Second,
were the court to declare that TT was YY’s parent as opposed to ‘mother’ or ‘father’, the
current birth registration regime would not afford a mechanism to effect such a regis-
tration.90 This concern is carefully spelt out in the Appeal Court judgment, which alludes
to the relative institutional competence of courts as compared to Parliament, which
would be better placed to act on amending legislation.91
In the European context, an amicus in the High Court had drawn attention to Parlia-
mentary Resolution 2239 (2018)92 of the Council of Europe, titled ‘Private and Family
Life: achieving equality regardless of sexual orientation’. The focus of this Resolution is
on achieving equality in ‘rainbow families’. It advocates that States ‘provide for trans-
gender parents’ gender identity to be correctly recorded on their children’s birth certif-
icates, and [to] ensure that persons who use legal gender markers other than male and
female are able to have their partnerships and their relationships with their children
recognised without discrimination’.93
The same amicus, citing a plethora of jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights, argued that a balance had to be struck between a parent’s individual right to
privacy, and the child’s right to know his or her biological identity.94 In the words of
Michael Freeman, the right to identity is also ‘a right not to be deceived about one’s true
origins’.95 However, while being aptly stated in the context of anonymous donation of
gametes, and surrogacy, the facts in this case do not suggest that YY would not know the
identity of the person who gave birth to him, as the High Court pointed out.
Counsel for YY alluded to the difficulties the child might experience when travelling
across borders with a person who is a man for all purposes, save parenthood, yet that
person is designated ‘mother’ on official documents. This would necessarily impact on
the child, YY, and would cause him anxiety and stress, counsel further claimed.96 It was
put forth that this was an interference in the right to private and family life, protected
under article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Applications for benefit
support, or student loan applications might also be impacted. This was argued to be an
interference in YY’s private and family life.97 The initial court agreed with this
assertion.98
Nevertheless, in that, despite the admitted interference with the right to private life of
both TT and his son YY, such interference was justified as being in accordance with the
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law, was for a legitimate purpose, and otherwise necessary, proportionate and fair.99 The
Court was persuaded that although the interference in their right to private life was
‘substantial’,100 it was outweighed by ‘the interests of third parties and society at large
in the operation of coherent registration scheme which reliably and consistently records
the person who gives birth on every occasion as “mother”‘.101
The initial court had opined that the organising criterion (as regards YY) was the best
interests test. This principle, the Court said, provided more support for registration of TT
as YY’s mother than as his father. Pitted against the child’s interest in having his birth
certificate reflect his lived reality was the need for every child to know with certainty
who gave birth to them.102 And since this is a generic, high level, and non case-specific
issue to be decided, it must be decided on principle. The principled approach is also to be
taken because it was not argued that YY was in any special category that would make his
circumstances different to the general cohort of children born to trans males.
The Appeal Court found similarly: that a child best interests should be taken into
account as ‘a’ primary consideration when striking a balance in legislation, and that this
is precisely what Parliament had done: the view of Parliament was that every child
should ‘have a mother and should be able to discover who their mother was, because
that is in the child’s best interests’.103
The Appeal court refers to the German case, which found in a similar vein that the
person who gave birth was to be recorded as ‘mother’, his new gender status as male
notwithstanding.104 The basis for this was the child’s right to know his origins. The
German court had premised this on the fundamental rights of the child, as not recording
the incidence of motherhood would deprive the child of essential information; it would
affect the right of the child to parental care and education by both parents; and on the
basis that the link to the biological reproductive function provides the child with a legally
stable association with a father and a mother.105 (Otherwise, the child would have only
one legal parent.)106
It seems that the approach to the best interests of the child under these circumstances
depends on whether the child’s right to know his or her biological origins is the pre-
dominant focus, or whether the objective is to guarantee the child’s right to (social)
identity. There may be a tension between these, as when the social reality and the factual
reality diverge. The CRC Committee defines best interests as a ‘dynamic concept that
requires an assessment appropriate to the specific context’, leading to the need for a
flexible case-by-case approach in determining its content.107
The view we support is that the best interests of the child in YYs case are better served
by protecting the child’s social reality, given that the this will serve to align the child’s
identity with his social reality for his entire childhood, and that the best interests of the
child has a temporal (longer term) dimension beyond the immediate decision as to how
his parental details are recorded on his birth certificate.108
Supporting this, by implication, are Vandenhole and Turkelli,109 citing with approval
the dissenting judgment of the European Court of Human rights in Mantel v. France.110
The case concerned a challenge to an abstract and generalised definition of the best
interests of the child was launched by Judge Nussberger in a dissenting opinion in a case
on paternal affiliation. The domestic courts had judged that the best interests of the child
lay in the establishment of its real biological affiliation rather than in the maintenance of
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the paternal affiliation with the husband of his mother. In his dissenting opinion, Judge
Nussberger introduced a distinction between the subjective and objective definition of
best interests, dismissing an objective one. Subjectively defined, the child did not want to
re-establish ties with the presumed biological father. The abstract and generalised def-
inition of the best interests, that is, to know the truth about one’s origins, failed to take
into account the child’s individualised concrete circumstances.111 In this case the child
lost his social and legal father and was forced to accept, during his adolescence, his
presumed biological father as his new legal father.
The assertion was made that identity is linked to the child’s right to dignity, which
Ronen defines in te following way: ‘The child’s right to identity derivative of their
human dignity should protect the development of an authentic self actualization indi-
vidual which maintains psychological ties, primary ties of interdependence to significant
others’.112
South African constitutional jurisprudence (including child rights case law) places
heightened emphasis on dignity as a founding constitutional value, and the right to
dignity would undoubtedly underpin an analysis of the true import of the child’s identity
rights in a situation such as that of YY. However, dignity is not an express CRC right,
and nor does it weigh in European human rights case law.
Conclusion
It is submitted that the proper application of the best interests principle should not be
susceptible to a ‘margin of appreciation’ or ‘discretionary area of judgment’, as the
Appeal Court in TT held.113 The South African Constitutional court has (in an elaborate
jurisprudence on ‘best interests’), twice adduced ‘best interest’ considerations as a
reason for permitting birth registration to mirror the social reality of the child.114 Further
jurisprudence in this regard seems likely, given recent judgments pertaining to the
unconstitutionality of sections of the Births and Death Registration Act and its
Regulations.
We submit that YYs best interests dictate that he should not be forced to confront the
confusing disjuncture between his lived experience and his civil registration details from
fairly early on in life. His best interests seem rather to point to the need for him to have
clarity as to his social identity115 from the outset.
Turning to the right to identity, again there is room to quibble with the judgment.
Right to origin information includes gestational information, but that does not mean that
every child has a right to know who his ‘mother’, specifically, is – merely the circum-
stances of his birth. The High Court judgment concedes that irrespective of the legal
status accorded TT, ‘for all other purposes, be they social, psychological or emotional,
TT will be a male parent and therefore [YY’s] “father.” This will be the social and
psychological reality of their relationship’.116 And as noted, those dimensions of identity
that are shaped by parental and community influence and by the child’s own lived
experience will mean that YY will grow up knowing TT as his father.
Finally, the question of the birth certificate itself. Here, the Swedish position is most
advanced in giving effect to the 2019 law that a man who gives birth to a child should be
regarded as the father of the child and that a woman who contributes with her sperm to a
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child’s birth should be regarded as the mother of the child, and recorded officially as
such. As every person has, as a corollary of the right to birth registration, the right to
access his or her own birth certificate, it is implicit that the relevant document belongs to
the person who is so registered, albeit that state authorities have legitimate interest in
recording the contents for civic and governmental purposes.117
Thus, it is our view that YY’s birth certificate is his – to have and to hold, and to
amend if needs be in future. And, having established that YY’s best interests suggest that
all identifying information accord with his lived social reality, he would most likely have
a keen preference in having the gestational parent designated as his father, as his counsel
argued. In summary, the German and the United Kingdom judgments do not support a
child rights reading of the child’s right to birth registration in the circumstances outlined
in the case under discussion. YYs best interests were not accorded the primacy that they
should have been.
As regards TT, ‘to claim – as English courts explicitly did – that McConnell’s
registration as “mother” does not necessarily indicate that he is female clashes with the
social reality that he is a male. Even though the court may claim that McConnell is a
“male mother,” society will understand his maternal status as being indicative of the
female legal gender and this might cause him to be treated accordingly’.118 In South
Africa, in the light of September, this would violate his ‘constitutionally enshrined
human rights’, as his human rights are ‘not being afforded . . . recognition, protection
and respect . . . Conduct which is part of [his] experience of being human is being con-
demned’.119 As the discrimination argument raised by TT’s counsel failed at the court a
quo, we assume that registering McConnell as mother of YY does not amount to dis-
crimination under UK law.
This contribution supports the contention that reconceptualising the law of parent-
child relations to adequately reflect both the biological origin and the social reality of a
child is required in the present era, when the law cannot accommodate the lived realities
of families.120
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